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QUIS VADIT CUM VOBIS, GALILEO?
Institutional Aspects Of Europe's Own Satellite Navigation System
Frans G. von der Dunk
International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden - The Netherlands
F.G. vonderDunk@law.leidenuniv.nl

institutional structure, the need for coordination and interoperability with GPS
and GLONASS (and possible other
systems), issues of negotiation with nonEuropean states, and dealing with liability
issues.

Abstract
With the decision early 2002 to develop
Galileo, the second generation European
GNSS-system, and to have it fully
operational by 2008, the member states of
the European Union (EU) and the
European Space Agency (ESA) have taken
a large step forward. The question "Quo
vadis, Galileo?' has therefore, by and
large, been answered - 'Into orbit!'
However, many legal parameters for the
future system have yet to be defined;
amongst those one of the most important is
the definition and establishment of the
institutional structure which should bring
Galileo there and make sure it remains
there, in a safe, sensible and operational
manner. In other words: 'Quis vadit cum
vobis, Galileo?' - 'Who goes (there) with
you?'
The paper will present a brief overview of
the issues involved in determining and
developing the
future
institutional
structure of Galileo, starting with the
current Galileo Interim Support Structure
(GISS) and the Joint Undertaking (JU)
which will be its successor. This will lead
into the issue of the prospective public
supervisor and private operator which are
supposed to be at the core of that
institutional structure, tied together by a
of
Concession
Agreement-type
arrangement.
In reflecting upon the various issues,
attention will be paid to an interesting
precedent from the satellite sector, i.e. the
privatisation of INMARSAT and its
transformation into Inmarsat. Other issues
to be touched upon in this light concern
the possibilities for non-EU and non-ESA
member states to join the Galileo core

1. Introduction
Early 2002, the member states of the
European Union (EU) and the European .
Space Agency (ESA) gave the final green
light for the development of Galileo. 1
According to the planned time schedule,
by 2008 some 30 satellites in MEO will
provide various timing, positioning and
navigation signals, in a number of cases
being vastly superior (in particular in
terms of accuracy and integrity2) to signals
emitted by the current GPS 3 and
GLONASS 4 systems.
At ITU's WRC 2000 and the recent 2003
WRC the necessary frequencies for
Galileo were secured. Then, last July also
the contracts for the first two Galileo
satellites were signed - one with Surrey
Satellite Technologies, the other with
Galileo Industries. In other words: all is
set now for Galileo to prepare for Full
Operational Capacity, due by 2008.
In further preparing the stage however,
one of the major issues concerns the
details of the institutional structure which
is to run Galileo. Contrary to GPS and
GLONASS, run by the military authorities
of a single country with other
governmental departments being merely
involved through consultation boards and
their likes, Galileo was envisaged from the
beginning as a Public-Private Partnership
(PPP). The private sector should be
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fundamentally involved in financing,
operating, maintaining and marketing the
system - for in further contrast to GPS and
GLONASS, Galileo will inter alia provide
services against fees.
Whilst the question "Quo vadis, Galileo?'
has thus by and large been answered, the
question to be dealt with by this paper by
contrast remains: 'Quis vadit cum vobis,
Galileo?' - 'Who goes (there) with you?'

focus on a number of personalised massmarket applications.
The Commercial Services by contrast will
be provided against a fee, and hence be
covered by a contract, to any value-added
service provider or end-user willing to
pay the price for the data added onto the
signal proper, as well as for a service
guarantee to be provided and other
benefits (such as relating to liability). The
positioning/navigation services provided
as Commercial Services will likely be
incorporated by value-added service
providers in such areas as banking
services, various telecommunications
applications and Location-Based Services
(LBS)
services with· a certain
commercial value, but not safety-sensitive
and hence not specifically requiring high
levels of continuity and integrity.
SOL, PRS and the contribution to SAR
might in contrast with OS and CS be
classified as 'public services', since their
raison d'etre is a public need for safetyand/or security-enhancing services.
The Public Regulated Services in a sense
also provide a second manifestation of a
contractual Galileo service. Since their
usage is envisaged in certain securityrelated and (other) governmental areas
(police and emergency services, possibly
also military usage), the signals will be
encrypted
and
secured
against
unauthorised usage. Access to these
services is principally available only to a
closed user group of governmental (or
closely government-aligned) entities,
which will have to conclude a contract in
some fonn to avail themselves of the
necessary decryption keys required for
access.
The Safety-Of-Life Services would then
form the third manifestation of contractual
core services to be provided by Galileo.
They will also somehow -likely indirectly
- be provided against fees, and will be
fully augmented (including the level of
integrity monitoring required by the
aviation
sector).
Thus,
somehow

2. The Galileo core services
Before going into further detail regarding
this essentially institutional question, it is
necessary to provide an overview of what
the system will actually do, and why it was
decided to develop it in the first place, in a
little more detail.
Galileo will provide a number of signals,
which through various combinations and
the addition of data or other features will
amount to five core types of services,
considered as Galileo-only services:
•
the Open Service (OS);
•
the Commercial Services (CS);
the Safety-Of-Life Services (SOL);
•
the Public Regulated Services
•
(PRS); and
•
a contribution to existing SearchAnd-Rescue Services (SAR).
OS and CS might be classified as 'private
services', in the sense that there are no
direct public concerns - as opposed to
general interests in economic and social
benefits - calling for such services to be
provided.
The Open Service essentially equates with
the signals known as GPS SPS and
GLONASS SPS (though it may offer
somewhat enhanced accuracy and
continuity), and will be provided without
any integrity monitoring. As an open
access signal it is available to anyone with
the right receiver, without any user fee.
Thus, there is no contract or quasicontract involved. Such usage will as a
consequence be individualised, and will
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contractual arrangements will underpin
this service provision, though as of yet it is
not certain how this would be structured,
as a consequence of the current structure
of navigation service provision in the
aviation sector.
Additionally, Galileo will contribute to the
existing global system of satellite-based
Search-and-Rescue
(SAR)
services,
notably as a European segment of the
COSPAS-SARSAT system. In view of its
special contributory character, however,
this Galileo service will not further be
taken into consideration here.
In addition to these five Galileo-only
services as dealt with, from a broader
perspective also Galileo local services are
to be provided by Local Elements plus
(optionally) Regional Elements; and
Galileo combined services are to be
provided by other systems together with
any combination of Galileo, Regional
Elements and various types of Local
Elements.
The option of co-operating with Regional
Elements is considered in order to allow
those non-European regions interested in
providing their own integrity monitoring
to link up with Galileo. Local Elements
are envisaged to be established wherever
there would be a local need for even more
enhanced accuracy and availability than
the Galileo services themselves can offer.

3. Galileo: Towards a PPP
Galileo is a project initiated by the
European Commission on behalf of the
European Union and its member states and
the European Space Agency and its
member states. 5 The overarching political,
economic and social mISSIOn of
establishing Galileo has been summarised
as "to develop and implement a
competitive,
leading
edge
Global
Navigation Satellite system, which
provides the best in choice and quality to
the end user, attracting business

investment and supporting ongoing social
and economic growth in Europe".6 In other
words: Galileo is supposed to bring social,
economic, safety- and security-related as
well as political and strategic benefits
especially to the European states and
peoples involved, but in a wider sense to
all states interested in such benefits.
It may be interesting to note in this respect
that the People's Republic of China has
declared its Willingness early in 2003 to
discuss a contribution in the range of 200
M€ to the development and deployment
phase of Galileo in return for substantial
and structural involvement in the system
operations at the highest level - i.e.
presumably either as member state of a
relevant public supervisory body, or as
partner thereof at a level of principled
equality.
One key element of the Galileo project
from the outset was the aim to include
private participation, comprising from this
perspective essentially both private
investment and private operational and
decisional involvement, in a fundamental
and substantive fashion through some
form of PPP. This aim is already reflected
at the highest level in the choice to include
both a public supervisor, taking care of the
various public interests and concerns in
Galileo, and a private operator reflecting
the PPP at the core of the institutional
structure.
The main reasons for involving a private
operator as a key entity in the
organisational structure for a system with
obvious fundamental public aspects were
the following:
•
for flexible, non-bureaucratic and
commercial modes of operation;
•
for marketing purposes;
•
for
obtaining
finances
and
investments from the capital markets in
normal commercial modes;
•
for dealing with IPR issues in a
proper and more commercially-oriented
fashion;
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•
for obtaining msurance against
limited liability; and
•
for making a sensible business
partner.
A further envisaged beneficial aspect of a
private operator is generally conceived to
consist of the far better capabilities of, and
opportunities available to, a private entity
to develop new services and markets in a
commercially assertive manner.
Vice versa, the reasons for involving a
public oversight body as a key entity in the
organisational structure for a system where
private and commercial modes of
operation have been deemed to be most
beneficial were the following:
•
for negotiating and concluding
agreements with states 'external' to
Galileo yet hosting Galileo-related
assets/service providers;
•
for
licensing
non-European
augmentation and integrity providers (or
negotiating and concluding agreements on
such operations by the private operator);
•
for serving the general public
interests e.g. in regard of safety, security
and search-and-rescue issues; and
•
for (possibly) offering unlimited
liability in the last resort to value-added
service providers and end-users.
Further envisaged beneficial aspects of a
public supervisor would generally be seen
to consist of enhanced trust by the public
at large in the system (with respect to such
issues as certification and safety licenses),
as well as by negotiating where necessary
access for the private operator to the
markets of states not belonging to the
Galileo core group of states. Finally, also
liaising with other relevant organisations
(such as ICAO and IMO) would best be
undertaken by such a public supervisor.

4. Galileo: the current status
Until recently, the task of preparing the
ground for Galileo fell on the Galileo
Interim Support Structure (GISS),

essentially embodying the assignment of a
number of expert ESA staff members to
work under guidance from the European
Commission. The GISS, established
December 2001, inter alia took over
supervision of the study projects going on
in the EU framework, as well as setting
the scene for a more permanent and
institutionalised entity once the political
hurdles at the highest level would have
been overcome.
Once this was achieved, the overarching
aim of combining the efforts, expertise
and input of both the public and the
private sector in Europe resulted in the
final establishment of the Galileo Joint
Undertaking
(GJU)
this
summer
following the relevant EU Council
Resolution of May 2002. 7 Currently the
GJU represents only the two key public
partners in Galileo, the European Union
through the Commission and the
European Space Agency, whereas at a
later stage it is envisaged that private
partners would also participate (including
through investments) in the GJU.
Legally speaking, the GJU is a unique
animal: whilst it would, at least for the
first period of its existence, essentially be
the vehicle for co-operation of two
intergovernmental organisations, the EU
and ESA, it does not constitute an
intergovernmental entity itself. To start
with, it was not established by means of
an international treaty, but through an EU
Council
Regulation.
Furthermore,
international legal personality was
expressly excluded at various points in the
texts. Whilst not a private entity properly
speaking either, for the purposes of
European law - or for that matter of the
national laws of the state where the GJU
is established, i.e. Belgium - it would
nevertheless be subjected to the same
regimes as private entities.
The present role of the GJU essentially
consists of preparing the ground in
general terms for the deployment and
operational phases of the Galileo system,
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and more specifically of selecting the
private consortium which would come to
play the central role in the institutional
structure as the private operator by that
time. Though nothing specific has been
decided or even indicated yet with respect
to such a scenario, it may tentatively be
assumed that the GJU (especially after the
private operator has been chosen) will
also prepare the ground for the public
supervisor, or possibly evolve itself into
taking such a role.
This last option would likely require the
absence of private participation in the
GJU other than in an advisory or
contributory capacity, since the public
supervisory character would fit ill with a
(co-)decision-making role of private
entities. It may be noted here that the GJU
as such is established for an interim
period, which indeed so far leaves all
options open.
5. The public supervisor
So, on the one hand it has been decided to
establish a public entity of the
international variant - currently going by
the name of Galileo Supervisory Authority
(GSA)8 - as a core element of the
organisational structure for Galileo. This
entity should at least take care of the
evident public interests in Europe in
building and maintaining the Galileo
system in the first place (e.g. security,
safety and general economic progress), as
well as relevant international aspects
(negotiations with third states), generally
speaking by exercising some sort of
control over the private operator.
In addition, the GSA may become the
owner of the system as a preferred option;
it should at a minimum be involved in
maintenance, replenishment and further
development thereof. However, this will
be a matter yet to be determined by policy
choices and concession negotiations.
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More in detail the role of the GSA as
public supervisor would have to focus on:
•
providing the political credibility at
the international level necessary to
enhance, wherever necessary through
international legal agreements, the
business opportunities for the private
operator, especially with regard to OS and
CS;
•
ensuring that the general public as
well as specific European interests in
Galileo are duly respected by the private
operator's operations and activities,
especially when it comes to SOL, PRS and
the contribution to SAR;
•
ensuring a proper and fair liability
regime,
possibly
including
a
Compensation Fund, for relevant types of
damage occurring in the course of Galileo
activities and operations;
•
ensuring a proper certification
scheme as a specific means to enhance the
overall trust of value-added servIce
providers, end-users, consumers and the
public at large in Galileo; and
•
ensuring that any bankruptcy or
other market failure of the private operator
would not unduly prejudice the overall
interests of the Galileo core states in
Galileo, preferably through ownership of
the system.

6. The private operator
On the other hand, the institutional
structure shall at its core include a private
company - currently named Galileo
Operating Company (GOC)9:it should at
least operate the system and market the
services, as well as develop new markets,
and in addition could possibly own the
system or at least be closely involved in
maintenance, replenishment and further
development thereof. This, however, as
indicated is in the last resort firstly a
policy or political rather than a legal
decision, and secondly, likely to be the
subject of further negotiations as part of

the bidding process for the Galileo
concession.
The role of the GOC as private operator
would consequently focus on:
•
using its market know-how and
other advantages of private modes of
operation for turning the provision of
Galileo services into a profitable business,
in particular with respect to OS and CS;
•
ensuring that the obligations
imposed upon it by or through the GSA
will be properly balanced with guaranteed
long-term revenues, such as by availability
payments or shadow tolls, and other
relevant assurances with respect to SOL,
PRS, and the contribution to SAR; and
•
ensuring generally that the risks
imposed on it through the PPP would be
those it is capable of handling best, and
this moreover in return for the proper
incentives.
It would be the GOC's business for
example to conclude contracts with valueadded service providers interested in
integrating CS into broader services to be
offered to the latter's customers; e.g. by
adding databases and communications
facilities offering taxi companies a
detailed and continuously updated traffic
information system.
Under circumstances, the GOC might also
come to act itself as value-added service
provider; especially for the purpose of
developing new markets by way of pilot
projects this is an approach currently being
contemplated. Also, whilst as such the
concepts of Regional Elements and Local
Elements have been developed envisaging
those to be entities outside the Galileo
institutional framework proper, nothing in
principle would prevent the GOC from
taking up such a role. At the same time,
both possible extensions of the GOC's role
would lead to considerable complications
as a consequence of additional legal
regimes and issues being involved.
By contrast to the above therefore, another
option open to the future GOC would be to
actually establish a daughter company for

each of the Galileo core services which are
to be delivered, in view of the fundamental
differences between OS, CS, PRS and
SOL (not to mention the contribution to
SAR) also in terms of markets.
If commercially feasible, the private
operator could also contract directly with
individual users who are interested in
Galileo timing or positioning information
of a higher quality than the OS, and are
willing to pay for it.
Finally, the GOC will serve the general
public as well as the aim of opening up
and developing new markets by the
establishment of Service Centres of some
kind, providing inter alia necessary
information on standardisation and
certification issues, liability arrangements
and general opportunities for contracting
with the GOC to obtain its services.
Again, as there are a number of serious
alternative options available, in the end
much will depend upon the bidding and
negotiating process as well as upon who
will finally win the concession.

7. The Galileo LegallFunctional Model
The above general analysis leads to a
rather complex construction in terms of
Galileo services and entities, which is best
illustrated by the Galileo Legal/Functional
Model developed in the context of various
Galileo-related studies; a generic summary
version of which, not including for
example the special case of Galileo' s
contribution to SAR activities, IS
reproduced below as Table 1.
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Table 1. The Galileo Legal/Functional Model (simplified generic version).

Local
Elements

Regional
Elements

services

Va/ueadded
services

8. The Concession Agreement
The most important issue, in legal terms,
of the PPP and the relationship between
GSA and GCO at the heart of Galileo' s
envisaged institutional structure, is
provided by a Concession Agreement,
serving as an umbilical cord between the
two entities.
From this perspective, such a Concession
Agreement, including wherever relevant
flanking arrangements, should first of all
establish clarity on key issues such as the
financing aspects which are at the heart of
any PPP - read the respective shares and
modes of financial contribution from
public and private sectors. This, in close
co-operation and consultation with the
private sector which has to bid for the
concession.
Such financing arrangements to be
proposed should closely mirror the

respective risks taken by public and
private sectors under the concession PPP.
Generally speaking risks are to be borne
by the respective PPP partner best
equipped to handle them, and should thus
distinguish between public and private
risks. Public risks in this regard refer to
such risks as policy, legal, regulatory and
licensing risks, in particular as relevant
for SOL, PRS and the contribution to
SAR in view of the public characteristics
of those services. Private risks would
refer in particular to financing and
commercial risks, such as revenue risks
(especially for CS) and intellectual
property rights-related risks (especially
for OS). Finally, some hybrid risks should
be dealt with jointly, such as most
importantly liability risks.
The Concession Agreement either itself or
through flanking arrangements should
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furthermore deal with the following
important issues:
•
the distribution of (contractual)
liability;
•
the possible need for denial of
Galileo services in security-sensitive
situations;
•
potential bankruptcy or other
fundamental failure of the GOC;
how IPR should be distributed and
•
dealt with;
•
to what extent service guarantees
would be imposed (in particular for SOL
and PRS, whereas with respect to CS it
should be left largely to the commercial
freedom of decision-making of the GOC);
certification;
•
•
long-term
planning
issues,
including re-competition issues and
availability payments or other public
sector contributions; and
•
the applicable commercial law for
any business disputes.

9. The Example of Inmarsat

For the future drafting of a Concession
Agreement
and
any
flanking
arrangements, the case of INMARSATafter-privatisation would serve as an
interesting
example.
The
residual
intergovernmental organisation IMSO
maintains, through a binding Public
Service Agreement which can not be
unilaterally altered or cancelled, control
over the private operator Inmarsat with
respect to those public services which the
latter is obliged to continue to provide. 1o
For Inmarsat, this mainly referred to the
Global Maritime Distress and Safety
System (GMDSS); in the case of Galileo,
this should refer especially to the
obligatory aspects of SOL, PRS and the
contribution to SAR, as well as the more
general obligations regarding security
issues in particular.
The PSA is further 'flanked' by a set of
arrangements,
called
Restructuring

Arrangements, dealing with other specific
aspects of the relationship IMSO-Inmarsat
and the transitional period. These
concerned:
• The Master Transition Agreement, the
principal agreement between the old
INMARSAT, the new Inmarsat
companies established under the UK
Companies Act of 1985, and the
Signatories. The other agreements,
with the exception of the LESO
Agreements, were
attached as
schedules to the Master Transition
Agreement.
• The Master Novation Agreements
between the old INMARSAT, the
Company and each Signatory relating
to the novation of Signatory contracts.
Under the Novation Agreements,
INMARSAT ceased to be a party to
any contract and was replaced by the
Company.
• The Business Transfer Agreement
between INMARSAT and Inmarsat
Ltd. relating to the transfer of the
business from INMARSAT to the
Company.
• The Licence Agreement between
INMARSAT and the Company
relating to the use of the INMARSAT
name and logo.
• The Shareholders Agreement between
Holdings and the shareholders, by
means of which the shareholders
agreed to support the company to
carry out an Initial Public Offering
(IPO).
• The Land Earth Station Operators
(LESO) Agreements between Inmarsat
Ltd. and each of the LES operators.
The LESO Agreement authorises the
LES operators to provide services via
Inmarsat.
Thus, a whole set of well-elaborated
arrangements was necessary to ensure a
proper transition from the old to the new
situation, as well as a proper relationship
between the new public and private
partners.
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10. Towards a Galileo Convention?
For a number of reasons, it might be
desirable moreover to establish a dedicated
Galileo Convention, i.e. an international
treaty between the Galileo core group of
states acting as an umbrella over the
Concession Agreement. This Convention
should inter alia provide for the proper
establishment of the GSA including some
measure of international legal personality
and functional immunities; as well as deal
with the residual responsibilities of the
states behind it, security- and safetyinterfaces
with
other
relevant
organisations and authorities, liability
solutions in terms of a Compensation
Fund, Galileo international relations,
certification schemes and the role and
competencies of any Galileo-dedicated
regulatory body if such a body were to be
established.
It should be noted here from an
institutional
perspective,
that
such
concepts as 'GSA' and 'Galileo-dedicated
regulatory body' in first instance would be
referring to abstract roles, without
prejudice as to which entity, new or
existing, would eventually be entrusted
with the relevant tasks, status and role.
Any Galileo-dedicated regulatory body
of
however
would
for
reasons
transparency and fairness obviously need
to be clearly separate from a GSA, even as
the latter will have some important public
and semi-regulatory competencies as well.
This means that if, for example, the
European Union as represented by the
European Commission would come to take
up the role of regulatory body - which it
seems excellently placed to do, in view of
the extended regulatory machinery which
the Commission can avail itself of - the
role of GSA by contrast should not be
played by any entity too closely aligned to,
or even part of, the EU institutional
machinery.

Whereas in the long run a Convention
would provide the optimum solution, it is
clear it might take a long time to become
realised, and might even turn out not to be
politically feasible. For both reasons,
certainly in the short run EC law
harmonisation measures, taking advantage
of
the
well-weathered
legislative
machinery existing within the European
Union, should in particular complement
existing law and regulation not to be
changed easily - in other words: in
particular in those areas not yet
structurally covered by legal regimes
(mostly focusing on the multi-modal
aspects of Galileo therefore, exceptions
mainly arising in such areas as rail and
road transport) and dedicated to the novel,
overarching and comprehensive features
of Galileo.

11. A special issue: liability and Galileo
Liability, as the most down-to-earth and
financially quantifiable issue in GNSS,
also presents a special issue from the
institutional perspective. In principle, a
number of existing relevant regimes would
remain applicable also to cases of damage
involving Galileo even if none of them are
to any appreciable extent focused on
GNSS or navigation-related issues. They
would moreover, to the extent agreed upon
at the international level, or conversely to
the extent constituting a matter for
national law of non-Galileo core states
relevant as potential Galileo markets, not
be easily changed by any regulatory effort
within those core states andlor the
European Union. This concerns in
particular non-contractual (third party/tort)
and product liability. Any Galileodedicated liability regime should therefore
be essentially built 'on top of such
existing liability regimes, e.g. by efforts to
harmonise relevant third party liability for
Galileo-related cases at an EU level - as it
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was achieved to some extent in the area of
product liability.
As to contractual liability, it would of
course operate in first instance as between
GOC and contracted service providers
(and possibly end-users). The relevant
contracts at the same time should deal
most prominently with derogation of noncontractual liability claims addressed to
the latter, to the extent erroneous or absent
Galileo signals/services would be found to
constitute the (ultimate) cause of the
damage. This in turn requires the
incorporation of monitoring equipment in
the system, in order to distinguish such
cases from those where other causes
would be responsible for the damage, as
well as a coherent certification system
providing the GOC with a possible
defence against undue claims.
Furthermore, in view of the Galileo
business case, it would be desirable to
establish a two-tier liability system in
dealing both with direct non-contractual
liability claims against the GOC, and with
the contractual derogation of noncontractual liability claims against its
contracted customers. The first tier would
call for liability of the GOC up to a certain
limit, for which the GOC would obtain
obligatory insurance at reasonable cost.
The second tier should be somehow taken
care of by the GSA and/or the member
states behind it, with the option of a
Compensation Fund (similar to the cases
of oil pollution ll and the nuclear power
industry 12) presenting the preferable
instrument.
Whilst these scenarios would obviously
have to be integrated into the Concession
Agreement or a flanking arrangement,
preferably they would also be covered by
the proposed Galileo Convention. In view
of the distinct possibilities for such a
Convention to be realised only at a later
stage, or even not at all, it would be
advisable in the meantime to use the
contractual chain-concept developed for
aviation-related liability in the context of
369

Eurocontrol and to be embodied in the
relevant Framework Agreement as much
as feasible also in the wider context of
Galileo, to ensure that a reasonably proper
and coherent liability regime would be in
place from the start.
Such liability 'guarantees' finally should
be incorporated as a core element into the
broader concept of service guarantees, as
these would be foreseen for (in particular)
CS (similar guarantees could also be
envisaged vis-ii-vis SOL and PRS, but
would take on a different character for a
number of reasons; in the first case it
might be better to refer to 'integrity
guarantees' , in the second case to 'security
guarantees') - but obviously subject to the
commercial feasibility as perceived by the
GOC-to-be. Such service guarantees
would, beside guaranteeing a certain
service level, also guarantee the
continuous availability of that service level
- in other words, effectively integrity.

12. Concluding remarks
It is clear that a highly complex, and in
some respects quite revolutionary system
such as Galileo is going to be, inter alia
requires a sound institutional and legal
framework within which to operate.
Whilst the main contours of such a
framework have by now gradually become
clear, such as the PPP-structure
encompassing a public supervisor and a
private operator at the heart of the system
and the need for a comprehensive
Concession
Agreement-structure
preferably backed up with a proper Galileo
Convention, these contours only raise
further and more detailed legal and
institutional issues. Some of them, e.g.
how risks have to be allocated, how
liability will have to be dealt with, and
how
to
balance
the
respective
competencies of the two entities thus
involved, have briefly been touched upon
in this paper. Some others, such as how to

deal with IPR, standardisation and
certification issue, still remain to be
analysed in greater depth.
Yet, generally speaking, analysis would
have to occur along the same lines; and the
Galileo LegallFunctional Model also here
may serve as an indicator as to how to
proceed. In any event, there is still a lot of
legal analysis and work to do, before
Galileo will become operational in 2008.
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